The Forgotten War is a descriptive label often applied to the Korean War (1950-1953) as the result of its perceived insignificance compared to other conflicts. The Air Force forgetting about special operations is another characterization applied to the Korean War. While it is correct the Air Force, as did the Army and Navy, found it lacked the organizations and units specifically devoted and committed to conducting special operations, the Air Force did have considerable air assets available to utilize to support special operations roles and conduct special operations missions.

The after World War II war fighting demobilization and force structure reduction War may not have been lessened or weakened the availability and readiness of special operations air assets as many historians might suggest. Some military histories suggest the United States Air Force’s focus on strategic airpower resulted in it having to develop a special operations capability during the Korean War. Some military histories suggest Air Force special operations as it exists today is the result of capabilities developed during the Korean War. However, troop carrier and airdrop capable aircraft existed in sufficient numbers and already existing technology was being improved or being replaced by new technology. Consequently, the Air Force while lacking a dedicated special operations service or agency did have sufficient air assets and experienced aircrew to perform special operations undertakings at the outbreak of the Korean War.

The most everything forgotten about the forgotten war is unfortunate. Unfortunate is the lack of awareness it was the Korean War which forced necessity to develop and embrace unconventional and psychological warfare. Forgotten is the extensive use of partisan forces for the purpose of setting up guerrilla bases in the enemy rear and conducting interdiction operations against the enemy. Forgotten is the first large scale combat airborne assault operation since WWII was also the first ever combat air drop of heavy loads (trucks, howitzers). Forgotten is the reluctance to utilize Army airborne pathfinder teams to mark initial drop areas because of risks being unacceptable, a significant concern that hampered even use of Air Force combat control teams for such initial drop area marking purposes for about two decades after the 22 February 1967 airborne assault phase of Operation Junction City. The scope and magnitude of airdrop operations included the first ever airdrop of a 35,000 pound M-2 roadway bridge, at Koto-Ri on 7 December 1950. There were also substantial quantities of special operations missions carried out by Air Force’s air assets. Relevant to this certain operational relationships developed during World War II aren’t given proper weight in the development of special operations air assets during and after the Korean War. The same mixture pattern of various units, to lesser extent, appears in the development of special operations air assets capabilities during and after the Southeast Asia conflicts (1961-1975).

With the war in Korea, the ability to insert and extract agents into remote areas within and behind enemy lines by aircraft and helicopters became a critical war winning strategy. Focusing on the methods and air assets doing such activities will allow establishing origins of a utilization pattern. It will do so by examining the accumulated historical evidence of USAF Pararescue personnel’s secretive low profile utilization in accomplishing special operations activities during the Korean War and subsequent conflicts and crisis where special operations provided depended on contributions to winning the fight. This document provides some of the most forgotten, most overlooked and least emphasized history.
The techniques and tactics devised for special air operations, employed with so much success in the Balkans, Western Europe, and Asia, were largely forgotten after the war as the AAF—later, the United States Air Force—focused on strategic air power. During the Korean War, the Air Force once again had to develop a special operations expertise. At this time, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) became the real focus for covert air special operations. For reasons of high policy, contract aircrews of the CIA assumed this task, supporting anti-Communist resistance groups throughout the world during the 1950s and 1960s. [Fueling the Fires of Resistance-Army Air Forces Special Operations in the Balkans during World War II, page 45]

Following World War II, United States Army special operations units virtually vanished in the rapid demobilization. The start of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 was the catalyst for the revival of the Army's special operations capability. The Army brought back the Rangers as company-sized units, stood up the 8240th Army Unit to train anti-Communist North Korean partisan forces and revived its nascent Psychological Warfare (Psywar) and Civil Affairs (CA) capability. [U.S. Army Psychological Warfare and Civil Affairs in the Korean War]

The traumatic experience of the Korean conflict was a watershed in the evolution of Army intelligence. Within six months, the Army found itself facing two major intelligence disasters: … In response, the Army hastily improvised a clandestine human intelligence (HUMINT) organization, building on a small existing intelligence unit, the Korean Liaison Office (KLO). By the end of the Korean War, the Far East Command (FECOM) had fielded a large Army-controlled clandestine collection apparatus, closely linked with similarly large operations in the fields of partisan and psychological warfare. … One basic problem was that both agent insertion techniques used by the KLO—parachute drops and line-crossing—were intrinsically hazardous, and even parachute agents had to exfiltrate through enemy lines to bring back their reports. [The Evolution of US Army HUMINT: Intelligence Operations in the Korean War]

Under the cover of unit identities such as Air Resupply and Communications Wings and as unique units and detachments of troop carrier squadrons, air commando and special air unit airmen flew behind the lines into North Korea and Manchuria dropping agents and leaflets. … Another common trend for Air Force special operations units in Korea was their intimate involvement in assisting in combat search and rescue (CSAR) efforts. [Air Force Special Operations Command: Making a “REAL” Air Force Major Command]

The 580th Air Resupply and Communications Wing began training in psychological and unconventional operations. The motto of the wing became “Libertas per Veritatem” -- Freedom through Truth. Prior to re-assignment, the wing developed a field training school that eventually became the predecessor of today’s Air Force survival training school. [480th Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Wing]

USAF Pararescue’s historical placement as put forth in this history is a minuscule speck on several other puzzle pieces emerging out of World WAR II as the military services, Department of Defense and other Governmental Agencies underwent significant organizational reengineering
and snatching for and retaining roles and missions. Even the National Park Service was a player in clandestine and covert operations during World War II. The organizations involved in performing clandestine and covert air operations are numerous, but the leading air asset contributors to Office of Strategic Services (OSS) activities were the troop carrier and theater airlift units.

The air asset organizations emerging out of World War II (WWII) having relevance to understanding this history is the Air Rescue Service, its parent organization the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) and another organization known as Civilian Air Transport (CAT).

The 1948 origin of the Military Air Transport Service is result of significant complications faced during WWII. Its post WWII snatching of troop carrier and theater airlift units has significant bearing on the development of special operations capabilities of the United States Air Force. The overreaching significance of MATS is it was a joint Air Force, Navy, and Army (by default of owning theater tactical airlift) war fighting command charged with maintaining wartime strengths and sufficient troop carrier and tactical airlift ready for immediate combat. It should be noted a role and mission snatch attempted was to have a Foreign Strategic Air Transport Division. MATS was result of the Unification Act which forced the merger of the Naval Air Transport Service and Air Transport Command. About 10% of MATS headquarter and transport operations personnel were Navy until it became constituted as the Military Airlift Command on 1 January 1966. One of MATS three Divisions, the Pacific was a Navy command. During 1952 the vice commander of MATS was Rear Admiral Hugh H. Goodwin. In regard to the Air Rescue Service and the USAF Pararescue specialty the follow the money has some significance. A Hoover Commission recommendation went into effect in 1957 changing how MATS offered its services. The offer of service for free from normally appropriated Air Force funds changed to airlift customers will pay for the services received. This opened the door of prioritizing among forces as well as among different weapon systems. However, the cause and effect of changes in funding operations pertinent to the development of air rescue and special operations air assets within MATS and the Air Force is beyond the purpose of this history.

Civilian Air Transport originated as a proprietary airline in 1946. Its most active clandestine and covert area of operations was in the former WWII CBI Theater. Since 1946 it has operated proprietary airlines known by names as Air America and many others. CAT’s motto “First in, last out” certainly represents their presence in China (1946) and involvement in the Korean War, the Belgian Congo Crisis and the Southeast Asia conflicts. It has WWII OSS origins and in a perspective relevant to MATS can be considered as being the Foreign Strategic Air Transport Division of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The Air Rescue Service was constituted effective 0001 hours, December 5, 1945 as part of the Continental Air Forces. This service was subsequently assigned, effective 13 March 1946 to the Air Transport Command (ATC). ATC merged with Naval Air Transport Service to become MATS in 1948. “The Air Rescue service was brought about largely through the efforts of Colonel S. Ford and associated officers, whose wartime experience in rescue work throughout the theaters of war made them fully aware of the need for an organization for the post-war air Forces which could organize, supervise, direct and control the rescue activities of the Army Air Forces.” The original fundamental concept of operations purposes for the Air Rescue Service
included: “inform all components of the U.S. Army on plans and programs for rescue service operated by Government agencies other than the Army Air Forces when such plans and programs involve changes in AAF requirements for rescue personnel; … to provide trained rescue personnel and units as required; to coordinate rescue matters with other U.S. agencies; and where authorized, with the rescue services of other governments.”

Many of the “associated officers” wartime experiences included serving with the OSS in some way. Colonel Richard K. Kight who assumed command of the Air Rescue Service on December 1, 1946 flew B-24 resupply air drop mission out of Australia into Java and did one such drop just before the Japanese arrived at the drop zone. For this mission he received the Distinguished Flying Cross. He piloted Wendell Willkie (diplomat, Lend Lease FDR’s representative in talks with USSR, China, England, and etc) around the world. During this around the world trip he successfully avoided German and Japanese aircraft attempts to intercept and shoot down the aircraft he was piloting. For this around the world “Gulliver” trip, he was awarded a second Distinguished Flying Cross.

Understanding the WWII combat and OSS experiences of the officers who were influential in the development of permanent Pararescue teams composed of personnel specifically trained to do parachute rescues has some bearing on understanding the historical utilization perspective this history focuses on.

- WORLD WAR II AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS -

Using the simplistic concept of ‘special operations’ being all military operations within or behind enemy lines there is sufficient evidence to assert air assets of the Army Air Forces played an increasingly relied on special operations role during WWII. Prior to World War II, the military had very little interest in transport aircraft to move troops and war fighting materiel. As the war proceeded, the need to move enormous tonnage levels of war fighting materiel by air drove demand for transport aircraft able to fly further and further distances and having larger and larger cargo tonnage carrying capacity and troop movement capacity. These transport aircraft were quickly adopted to perform other roles such as delivering airborne forces by parachute within and behind enemy lines and to use air drop methods to supply and resupply troops on the combat front lines, within enemy lines, and behind enemy lines. Consequently, it is reasonable to assert Office of Strategic Services’ combat operations and numerous Army Air Forces units had mutual interdependent cooperative overlapping role and mission relationships. This was certainly true concerning ‘search and rescue’ and recovery evacuation of downed combat aircrew operations.

Much of the search and rescue air asset capability developed during WWII was consolidated functionally under a single organizational entity called the Air Rescue Service. Although the end of WWII had stagnated search and rescue air assets force structure growth, the constant demand to search for missing aircraft and rescue of crews and passengers of these aircraft kept a valid mission need a serious reality. When the Air Rescue Service began in May 1946 it was modeled after the rescue capability developed during WWII in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater with some contributing influence of aircrew evacuation activities of Aircrew Rescue Unit (ACRU) # 1 activated 24 July 1944 under 15th AF for purpose of rescuing downed aircrew from Yugoslavia. Unnoticed or perhaps unmentioned by many historians is little known fact that an initial purpose of the Air Rescue Service was to train mission ready search and rescue aircrews and give them away to theater commanders. When the newly established Air Rescue Service transferred to the newly established United States Air Force (September 18, 1947) it was given program
management responsibility of providing survival training facilities and courses from the deactivated Air Force School of Applied Tactics. The Air Rescue Service retained its worldwide responsibility of providing aircrew survival training responsibilities until the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) transferred this responsibility to the Air Resupply and Communications Service (ARCS) shortly after its February 23, 1951 activation. This resulted in Air Rescue Service concentrating its survival training efforts on training its Pararescue personnel until budget constraints force closure of the original Pararescue School effective December 1952.

The initial concept of aircrew loses can and will be reduced with proper training in environmental and situational survival was developed and put into practice originally in the CBI Theater. Lt Col Flickinger after accomplishing the first successful parachute rescue of aircrew and passengers from an area within enemy lines was reassigned in June 1944 as the Chief of the Air Force School of Applied Tactics, Orlando Florida. In this position, he was instrumental in establishing the first survival school giving aircrews training in environmental and situational environment. As Chief of the Air Force School of Applied Tactics he and commander of the Air Rescue Service advocated and for and convinced the Army Air Forces to approve and establish in 1946 the rescue and survival MOS. During the Air Force’s process of converting Army MOSs to AFSCs the Rescue-and-Survival MOS was split into three separate Pararescue, Survival Training Instructor, and Survival Equipment (Life Support) AFSCs.

In July 1943, the Army Air Forces’ need to rescue airmen from difficult terrain in the CBI Theater led to search and rescue fixed wing aircraft having availability to pick-up downed aircrew without landing. After WWII the aircraft modifications, devices, methods and procedures of the All American System were further engineered and developed. The All American System subsequently became the Skyhook system and finally the Fulton surface-to-air recovery system. During the Korean War, the CIA and special operations air assets used the All American system to recover covert agents out of North Korea and Manchuria.

[The Air Force continued to improve the system, even developing a package containing telescoping poles, transfer line, and harness that could be dropped by air. The first operational use of the system came in February 1944, when a C-47 snagged a glider in a remote location in Burma and returned it to India. Although the Air Force never used it to pick up individuals, the British apparently did use it to retrieve agents. … On the evening of 29 November 1952, a CAT C-47 with CIA officers John T. Downey and Richard G. Fecteau departed Seoul for Kirin Province, intending to pick up members of a team that had been inserted the previous July. But a double agent had betrayed the team, and the Chinese shot down the C-47 as it came in for the pickup, killing the pilots and capturing the CIA officers. Fecteau was not released until December 1971; Downey was freed in March 1973.]

WWII is the origin of troop carrier and aerial resupply aviation. These air assets made major contributions to the war effort in many different ways. Troop carrier forces were tactical forces listed as combat units having mission of delivery of airborne troops, air resupply of ground forces on the front lines and was an aerial logistics keeping dispersed ground units supplied. Some had a special quality that set them apart, but geography of the combat theater and the
forces they supported had more influence than being assigned a mission role. Airplanes were simple flown to fulfill the immediate operational or tactical need. The troop transport crews were counted on to enter dangerous conditions, perform their missions admirably, and return the next day if necessary. The parachute insertion and airdrop supply missions called for flexibility with the best application of technology to accurate location of LZs and DZs.

In the CBI area of operations, air supply was the primary and often the only means of supplying Allied ground forces in action against the enemy. The vast remote wilderness of the region also drove need for parachute rescue teams to rescue survivors of plane crashes. This is what CBI tactical combat and special operations air assets contributed to the other WWII combat theaters. The centralized controlling Air Rescue Service organization inherited this capability. Within the Air Rescue Service existed the centralized control agent that special operations air assets lacked until the Air Resupply and Communications service was established in 1951.

U.S. Army Air Forces Booklet "Man Pickup" [Technical Order No. 03-1-57] prepared by Miscellaneous Branch and Specifications Drawings Office, Equipment Laboratory, Headquarters Air Technical Service Command, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio. Illustration by unidentified artist depicts an incident from "Tales of the Arabian Nights," in which Sinbad the Sailor, having found himself at the bottom of a sheer-walled valley, ties a chunk of meat to his back in hopes of being picked up by a hungry roc (giant eagle).

- END OF WORLD WAR II AND PRE-KOREAN WAR SPECIAL OPERATIONS -

The conclusion of World War II during August 1945 found the Army Air Forces with sixteen numbered Air Forces, 2.2 million men and women and 68,400 aircraft. The subsequent demobilization and force reduction between September 1945 and June 25, 1950 did consolidate and merge air assets having special operations capability. However, unprepared in training and having special units with specially designed aircraft conveniently based to do special operations may more appropriately describe circumstances than vanished or forgotten capability.
Shortly after WWII ended most, if not all, of the Army Air Forces’ WWII special operations air assets transferred intact to the newly established United States Air Force (September 18, 1947). Furthermore the aftermath of the "roles and missions" battles during 1948 (Key West Agreement/ Function of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff drafted by James V. Forrestal) unquestioningly resulted in the Air Force gaining dominant control of most, if not all, of the Department of Defense’s strategic and tactical special operations air assets. Although budget cuts and fiscal constraints didn’t encourage growth of special operations air assets, capability the more accurate reality was no organizational entity responsible for developing the tactics, techniques and procedures for employing special operations aviation to replace the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was established.

The February 23, 1951 activation of the Air Resupply and Communications Service (ARCS) while hailed as the most ambitious commitment to Special Operations since World War II was actually an action to combine existing overt and covert intelligence and propaganda missions into a single organization. Its psychological warfare function included the capability of preparing psychological warfare material in printed form, propaganda, and jamming enemy frequencies. Its aerial resupply function included the capability of introducing and evacuating ranger-type personnel behind enemy lines and supplying them and guerrilla units.

It is the aerial resupply role and mission function that resulted in the overlapped use of aircraft, tactics, methods and procedures that differed very little from what the Air Rescue Service was doing for search and rescue purposes. Consequently, the after WWII origin of a still existing pattern of rescue and special operations unit cross flow utilization is traceable to 1951.

[During the six month period, 186 Psychological Warfare Officers were processed through this headquarters. These officers were assigned to this headquarters following their selection for the Psychological Warfare Course which was conducted at Georgetown University, Washington DC. The 14 week course included the following subjects: Comparative World Cultures; Values at Stake in the Present conflict; Political Structures and Practices including Military Government; Sociological Aspects of U.S. Foreign Policy; Historical Aspects of Psychological Warfare; Psychological Warfare Technique and Practice; and economic Factors in the Contemporary World Situation. The initial class of this continuing program was begun on 1 February 1951.]

Although there certainly is specialized aircraft overlap, focus of the cross flow pattern will be limited to USAF Pararescue as the never-ending extensive debate on USAF Pararescue role and mission utilization originates during the Korean War. In addition, the 1953/4 deactivation of the Air Resupply and Communication units and finally the Air Resupply and Communication Service took the only Advanced Survival School in the Air Force into extinction with it.

The origin of Air Force survival schools is attributed to being at Marks AFB in 1947 is slightly misleading as historical evidence is the first officially designated Army Air Force School began operations during June 1944 under control of Aeromedical School at the Air Force School of Applied Tactics. The first students trained by the school were personnel equipment officers, who in turn were responsible for establishing unit level survival training throughout the AAF. After
WWII the Air Rescue Service assumed the responsibility of continuing survival training facilities for the now separated United States Air Force. In order to meet worldwide Air Force requirements, the field training sites were expanded to include Florida, Texas and Labrador.

[During the month of November 1947, five enlisted men (5) and two (2) medical officers and a representative from the A-3 section, HQ Air Rescue Service (Lt Elliot) … these parachutists formed the nucleus of instructor personnel in the pararescue survival school conducted at MacDill AFB Florida. … A survival school was opened under the supervision of the 5th Rescue Squadron which trained students, in conjunction with the para-jumpers training, in methods of survival in all climates and terrain conditions.]

[The 2156th ARU (TTU) was established in December 1949, at MacDill AFB, Tampa, Florida, and functions as the official ARS training activity. … This unit also conducts the Para and Land Rescue, Survival, and Escape and Evasion school.]

[The 2156th Air Rescue Squadron activated on January 21, 1950. Its purpose included providing most of the training needed to get new pararescue personnel mission ready trained and qualified. The overall curriculum contained the following general courses of instruction: Precision spot parachuting techniques, land navigation, land rescue, native psychology, mountain climbing, advanced swimming techniques, evacuation of injured or distressed personnel, administration of advanced first aid and other medical procedures, special vehicles operations, communications, aerial delivery of equipment and supplies. The survival training was broken down into four phases; Tropical and Jungle, Desert, Arctic, and Mountain.]

[Since rescue operations necessitated team members performing their missions in wilderness areas without the facilities of civilization, a background in activities in comparable activities was desired for personnel interested in receiving rescue and survival training. It has been determined the training received at the 2156th Air Rescue Squadron (TTU) did not necessarily qualify an individual as a team member, therefore, other prerequisites were needed such as having service with the United States Forest Service or other comparable organizations provided such service was active operationally rather than administratively, avocations or vocations such as trapping, extensive hunting, professional guides, forest rangers, game wardens, and extensive farm experience of such nature that indicated inherent responsibility and sense of improvisation. These were some of the requirements which had to be met before applicants for rescue and survival team training would possibly be considered.]

The Air Rescue Service assisted in establishing a survival-training program at Chanute AFB and assisted in the establishment of the survival school for the Air Resupply and Communications Wing located at Mt Home Idaho. Historical records clearly and distinctly identify a 2156th Air Rescue Squadron, Technical Training, Mobile Training unit was attached to 1300 Training
Squadron to conduct survival training of ARCS tactical wing personnel. Other documents identify Mt Home AFB was already being used as field training site by the 2156th Air Rescue Squadron to give survival training to student USAF Para rescue personnel.

In March 1952, responsibility for all of MATS’ formal survival, escape and evasion training transferred from the Air Rescue Service to the Air Supply and Communications Service. Unfortunately, as the Korean War drew to a close the ARCS with no peacetime mission developed became expendable, as almost did the Air Rescue Service, during the post Korean War budget tightening and force reduction process. The turmoil of force reduction immediately following the Korean War certainly contributed to the shutting down of the original 2156th Air Rescue Squadron operated Rescue and Survival School on 24 December 1953.  

Attempts to justify a formal survival training school prior to 1943 met with failure through disapproval of the commanding officer of the School of Applied Tactics. However, in late 1943 the War Department issued an order to the School of Applied Tactics to establish a survival training school. During 1944, this school began training students. This predates the August 1947 establishing of the aircrew survival school at Marks AFB near Nome Alaska by three years. The official Air Force Histories of the development of formal survival training courses unfortunately credit the Arctic Indoctrination School at Nome AFB as being the first.  

The Strategic Air Command opened its second survival school, a mountainous terrain orientation school, on 16 December 1949 at Camp Carson, Colorado. There is significant omission in “official” histories failing to mention the first students trained by the survival school operated by the School of Applied Tactics during 1944 and 1945 were mostly personnel equipment officers, who in turn were responsible for establishing unit level survival training programs throughout the Army Air Forces.

[Under present planning the size of the team (para rescue) has been reduced to five members, and the number of teams reduced to 23 … As a result of our decreased requirement for these technicians, HQ MATS could not justify retention of the Rescue and Survival School at PBIA. Consequently our trainees will receive this training at McCall Idaho.] 

[On 14 December 1953 a message was received from Headquarters MATS advising that the MATS Advanced Survival School at McCall, Idaho was to be deactivated on 24 December. This message further stated that ARS quantitative requirements for para rescue technicians (rescue team personnel) did not justify continuation of this training on a MATS Command Course basis. In view of this information, Headquarters, Air Rescue Service was requested to re-evaluate qualitative requirements for this training and to advise MATS of any assistance required to provide this training within air Rescue Service.] 

[As a result of intensive study and as interim measure, a small training unit was established at the 43rd Air Rescue Squadron, McChord AFB, Washington. Lieutenant Colonel John C. Shumate, former Commander of the MATS Advanced Survival Training School and five (5) of his best instructor personnel were assigned to the unit to train future para rescue personnel who have completed...]

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jump training at Ft. Benning, Georgia and medical training at Gunter AFB, Alabama. Only a minimum of survival training will be taught at McChord. Students will receive their “area specializations” training in their assigned units.]32

[During this discussion we want to remember that there is no career field for pararescue personnel outside of this command. Therefore, the training problem will remain constant and heavy.]33

In April 1953, the Air Staff directed ARCS to limit operations to Air Force only projects, thus ending support for such outside agencies as the CIA. Nine months later Department of the Air Force Letter 322 and Military Air Transport Service General Order 174 deactivated ARCS, effective 1 January 1954.

On September 1, 1954, Air Training Command became the single manager Survival Training provider for the Strategic Air Command, Military Air Transport Service and Tactical Air Command. This concentrating all formal survival training schools and courses under a training only organization took emphasis away from the training personnel with the knowledge and skill proficiencies to perform the SERE activities needed to accomplish rescues of downed aircrew and other isolated personnel.

[To provide the trained aircrews and technicians needed by the expanding Air Force, the Air Training Command in 1951 established a Flying Training Air Force and a Technical Training Air Force, and in 1952 it set up a Crew Training Air Force.]34

This consolidating put all Air Force survival schools into a training-and-educating organization lacking integration into Air Force operations. The training deficiencies impact, however, in reality resulted from an overall air forces organizational culture and majority student demographics having no stakes in survival-vocation skill development. The unintended impact consequences is as the Air Force operational activities become more aviation oriented with less participation in ground tactical activities the tactical echelons of command gained increasing numbers of staff officers and commanders risk averse to the SERE operational environment. Overtime the no stakes in survival-vocation skill development mired Air Force survival training and courses in focusing on simple survival training, code of conduct training, and some rudimentary exposure to simulated evasion, resistance to interrogation and exploitation training environments that were rapidly becoming inadequate and insufficient in preparing those air force ground combatants who are expected to go on the ground within enemy controlled territory and behind enemy lines to rescue downed aircrews.
The origins of the Army Special Forces’ SERE training program and course in 1981 which focused on training special operations forces (members of U.S Army Special Forces, members of 75th Ranger Regiment, Pathfinders) followed by the establishing of the Joint Services Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Agency (JSSA) in 1991 and Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) in 1999 contributed much to Air Force’s survival training programs becoming SERE training programs. This included the transformation of the Air Force’s Survival Training Specialty becoming the SERE Specialty effective 30 October 1994 followed by gain of providing all local base level SERE training from the Aircrew and Life Support specialty when this specialty became the Aircrew Flight Equipment Specialty in 2007.

Although military SERE training has expanded since 1981 to address three specific captive environments of peacetime governmental detention, hostage detention and wartime captivity, the Air Forces’ primary concern remains downed aircrew trying to evade capture and surviving captivity more so than conducting small tactical team operations on-the-ground behind enemy lines or in a region of low-intensity conflict (asymmetric warfare) where front lines do not exist.

The essential historical aspects being emphasized concerning military SERE training is it lacks purpose to provide the knowledge and skills training necessary to deliberately conduct or accomplish intentional military activates in unpopulated and populated areas behind enemy lines or in or in a low-intensity conflict (asymmetric warfare) where front lines do not exist. The secondary emphasis is SERE training between wars tends to substantially suffer the effects of budget cuts.

Evasion and escape difficulties increased significantly after World War II. Not only was certainty of evaders being able bend in with the indigenous population becoming less likely, but more importantly the presence of dependable partisan forces, insurgent forces, and resistance groups to aid with the evasion and escape was becoming less certain. However, unlike other commando, ranger, and raider capabilities that didn’t survive the post WWII military forces drawdown and military budget slashing the USAF Pararescue over the horizon parachute insertion into remote austere harsh and often hazardous weather and climatic environments with minimal air drop supply and resupply support thrived as result of purpose to rescuing and providing emergency medical aid, survival assistance and security to survivors of missing and crashed military and civilian aircraft.

This unique one-of-a-kind operational capability sustained after WWII combined with the time and expense necessary to duplicate positioned USAF Pararescue forces to be utilized for both conventional and special operations purposes and activities. Special operations is simply the use of specially trained, equipped, and organized forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national objectives during peacetime or period of hostilities. Unfortunately, because the military combat rescue objectives often lack "target of importance" purpose of delaying, disrupting, or destroying enemy forces the USAF Pararescue utilization in special operations activities contributing to the pursuit of national objectives during peacetime and periods of armed conflict is overlooked by many historians.
Operational Security concerns, classifying actions in addition to intra- and inter-service dynamics certainly contributed there being a lack of detailed information pertinent to specific conventional and special operations mission utilizations of pararescue personnel during the Korean War (June 25, 1950 to July 27, 1953).

Most likely beliefs also existed within the Air Force policy and doctrine making hierarchy that the utilization of USAF Pararescue personnel for covert and clandestine military activities and operations probably wouldn’t be applicable to future hostilities (white hat overt rescue vs black hat clandestine and covert special operations).

Fortuitously there is irrefutably historical record documenting aircrews, aircraft and helicopters of the Air Rescue Service did routinely fly overt, covert and clandestine sorties for purposes and activities other than to rescue downed aircrews.

The most overreaching conclusion having correctness is all air rescue units and classified air units (air commando, special mission, and special operations) in Korea had overlying overt, covert and clandestine mission utilizations. However, the specifics of who was performing what airborne duties and activities on the aircraft to get the mission objective of the sortie accomplished are not established in any compiled history. Although paramedics teams
(para-rescue) of the Air Rescue Service arrived on the Korean peninsula no later than July 1950, what these paramedics (para-rescue) did during the war gets minimal attention.

The presumption of paramedics (para-rescue) duties and utilization being limited or restricted to flying only on Air Rescue Service fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters predisposes historians to not seek out what else the paramedic teams might be doing that had had no connection to rescuing downed aircrews.

Historical records somewhat collaborate memories provided by two para-rescue combat veterans of the Korean War during separate by phone interviews during December 1993 and January 1994. These recollections involved para-rescue’s drop zone involvement with the two combat airborne assaults accomplished during the Korean War, flying on other than Air Rescue Aircraft, some sort of involvement with Evasion and Escape (E&E) routes, a planned but cancelled airborne raid to liberate prisoners of war, and providing survival and parachuting training to various not disclosed individuals.

Post WWII slashes in military budgets and manpower constraints had left many military units with no personnel trained to collect tactical intelligence or to accomplish covert ranger or commando type activities. Further unconventional warfare was considered an out-of-the-mainstream activity that encountered resistance and lack of understanding during the post WWII period of budgetary and manpower constraints. In comparison, with significant differences, the training and utilization of enlisted USAF para-rescue personnel had remained invulnerable to the slashes in military budgets and the deficiencies resulting from manpower constraints. Consequently during the post WWII period USAF Pararescue had become the only military force or capability routinely relying on aircraft and parachute to be put on the ground or in the ocean anywhere in the world on short notice. In a general sense para-rescue personnel had combined aircrew and airborne commando knowledge, skills sets and experience that were sought out during the Korean War. Even if not deliberately sought out, the US Eighth Army’s and Far East Air Force’s lack of helicopters certainly contributed to para-rescue involvement on the drop zone connected to the two separate combat assaults accomplished by the 187th Airborne RTC and planned but cancelled airborne raids to liberate captured UN prisoners of war.

[... in the case of airborne operations that the Air Force was responsible for evacuation of casualties from the objective area until such time as ground linkup was attained.]

[August 25, 1950: The capture of Major General William F; Dean’s (commander 24th Infantry Division), after evading on his own since 24 July 1950, resulted in several plans being developed to liberate UN POWs during 1951. The central objective for planning Operations Mustang I (cancelled July 1951) and Mustang II (cancelled September 1951) was the desire to rescue Major General William F; Dean. Both plans had similar concept to parachute in forces to take the camp, free all prisoners and extract all by means of helicopters.]

[April 1951: Detachment 3, 6004th Air Intelligence Service Squadron (AISS) activation was borne of Fifth Air Force’s frustration with CIA escape and evasion efforts for recovery of downed airmen. Detachment 3’s activities emphasizing...]

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aircrew training in emergency procedures, the use of radios and survival equipment, and helicopter rescue procedures. The detachment also conducted ongoing experiments, such as "snatching" downed personnel by specially equipped C-47s (The All American System).]42

Past and present-day advocates of Air Force special operations and Air Force combat rescue capabilities focus on the two-way use of aircraft and helicopters to do rescues of downed aircrews,43 rescues of stranded personnel from behind enemy lines,44 insertions and extractions of insurgent guerrilla teams and intelligence agents,45 casualty evacuations of critically wounded from the battlefield and emergency supply and resupply of units in the field. Little existed to focus attention on Air Force’s surface covert and clandestine activities as no such capability was matured to handle such covert and clandestine activities.46 Furthermore the only existing Air Force forward air-ground capability operating tactically during this war was the Tactical Air Control Party, composed of an experienced pilot officer, who served as forward air controller, and the airmen needed to operate and maintain the party's vehicular-mounted communications equipment, were the only “officially” existing most noticeable forward air-ground capability during this war.47 Combat Control Teams did not come into existence until mid-1952 and Mobile Weather Observing Teams, precursor to Combat Weather Teams did not come into existence conceptually until December 1956 with published doctrine and policy which specifically addressed procedures for tendering service to Army units not existing until October 1957.48 A small weather team having special operations utilization didn’t come to exist until 1964.49 Consequently the utilization of individuals of one specific AFSC presumed to be being there as medics on helicopters flying here and there to rescue downed aircrew got minimal, if any, interest or attention in official histories and articles published about the Korean War.

Air Force historical subject continuum pertinent to special operations and combat rescue activities during the Korean War focuses on one or the other. For example the special operations focus is on the activities and accomplishments of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron and the 581st Air Resupply and Communications Wing (AR&CW).

[December 1952: Eighteen months following activation in the United States and six months after its movement to the Philippines, the 581st Air Resupply and Communications Wing (ARCW), the first USAF organization at this echelon with a special operations mission, began operations in Korea. The wing's mission included waging propaganda warfare by leaflet drops, radio broadcasts, conveying personnel and equipment behind enemy lines, supplying resistance movements, and evacuating special operations personnel. Its responsibilities included complete support (equipping, training, transporting, and housing) of guerrilla personnel. Its first recorded operations involved a flight of four H-19 helicopters that belonged to the 581st ARCW and deployed to South Korea. This helicopter detachment flew covert and clandestine intelligence missions from Seoul, including the insertion of South Korean agents behind enemy lines.]50

[12 April 1953: The rescue of fighter jet ace Captain Joseph McConnell Jr., who bailed out over the Yellow Sea which is commonly believed to have been accomplished by a H-19 helicopter of the 3rd Air Rescue Squadron, was actually
a H-19 helicopter assigned to the 581st Air Resupply and Communications Wing, (a special operations unit) collocated next to the 2157th ARS.]

Whereas, the operational combat rescue continuum focus on the units and aircraft of Air Rescue Service’s 3rd Air Rescue Squadron is centered on and the rescue of downed aircrew and casualty evacuation of the most seriously wounded.

[The Korean War offered the first test for search and rescue organizational tactics developed in World War II. For the performance of search and rescue functions in June 1950, FEAF possessed the 2d and 3d Air Rescue Squadrons. Administratively, these units were a part of the world-wide Air Rescue Service-a subordinate command of the Military Air Transport Service-but their operations were controlled by FEAF and its subordinate commands. …

... Under the command of Lt. Col. Klair E. Back after 28 August 1950, the 3d Air Rescue Squadron pioneered in the employment of new search and rescue equipment and techniques, which, for the first time as a standing procedure, included the rescue of stranded personnel from behind enemy lines.]

Unfortunately such narrow organizational oriented histories obscure and perhaps blur other what happened and more importantly why did it happen Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine and civilian organization (Central Intelligence Agency) relationships and influences. Various imprecise Joint Action Armed Forces (JA AF) agreements implemented between 1947 and 1950 certainly contributed to ad hoc improvised solutions being relied on. Some of the imprecision led to presumptions the other service had the responsibility to provide the assets and the capabilities. Also probably contributing to the why and how is significant unconventional experience gained during WWII was possessed by two Air Force generals in the right combat command positions during the initial most critical ad hoc decision making period.

[For the first ten months of the war, CIA used U.S. Far East Air Force (FEAF) aircraft to drop agents and materiel into North Korea. CIA first began dropping agents in the twelfth week of the war. A detachment of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron eventually redesignated as Flight "B" of the Fifth Air Force provided most of the support.]


[April 1949-May 1951: Lieutenant General George Edward Stratemeyer, Commander FEAF. Was in the China-Burma-India Theater from mid-1943 thru to 1946. Appointed commanding general of the India-Burma Sector and air adviser to the commanding general of the China-Burma-India Theater. Subsequently in April 1944 appointed commander of the Army Air Forces in the China Theater with headquarters at Chungking.]
The Air Rescue Service assets in Korea were SA-16 Grumman Albatross Amphibian Aircraft, SB-17 Boeing Boat Carrier Aircraft, C-47 utility cargo aircraft, L-5 Stinson Sentinel Liaison Cargo aircraft, H-5 helicopters, H-19 helicopters and paramedic (pararescue) teams. Although paramedics teams (pararescue) arrived on the Korean peninsula no later than July 1950, the presumption the paramedics duties limited or restricted their being there utilization to flying only on Air Rescue Service fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters predisposes historians to not seek out what else the paramedic teams might be doing to contribute to winning the war.

[June 26, 1950: USAF SB-17 aircraft provided rescue cover for the initial evacuation by sea of U.S. citizens from Seoul.]^{57}

[July 13, 1950: 3d Air Rescue Squadron (ARS) began flying SB-17 aircraft off the Korean coast to drop rescue boats to downed B-29 crews.]^{58}

[July 22, 1950: The 3d ARS deployed the first H-5 helicopter in Korea to Taegu.]^{59}

[August 3, 1950: SA-16 amphibious rescue aircraft began flying sorties along the Korean coast to retrieve U.S. pilots forced down during operations.]^{60}

[September 23, 1950: In the first recorded special operations mission of the war, SB-17 aircraft of the 3d ARS made a classified flight in Korea.]^{61}

[October 21, 1950: H-5s of the 3d ARS evacuated some thirty-five paratroopers in the first use of a helicopter in support of an airborne operation. H-5s also evacuated seven American POWs from the area.]^{62}

[October 7, 1950: USAF airplanes dropped food to a group of 150 former POWs who had escaped during the North Korean retreat.]^{63}

[March 23, 1951: Operation TOMAHAWK, the second airborne operation of the war and the largest in one day, … Helicopters evacuated only sixty-eight injured personnel from the drop zone.]^{64}

[March 31, 1951: 3d ARS used the H-19 to retrieve some eighteen UN personnel from behind enemy lines, the first use of this type helicopter in a special operations mission.]^{65}

[April 17, 1951: An intelligence operation behind enemy lines resulted in the recovery of vital components of a crashed MiG-15. In Operation MiG, a (3d ARS) YH-19 helicopter transported a U.S. and South Korean team to the crash area south of Sinanju, North Korea. Under friendly fighter cover, the party extracted MiG components and samples and obtained photographs. On the return flight southward the helicopter came under enemy ground fire and received one hit. The successful mission led to greater technical knowledge of the MiG.]^{66}
[April 21, 1951: An SA-16, 3d ARS, attempted to pick up a downed enemy YAK pilot near Chinnampo for intelligence purposes. The aircrew landed and put out a raft but had to take off because of intense enemy fire, leaving the YAK pilot behind.]\(^{67}\)

[December 1952: To help in southern Korea and the western end of the battleline, the 2\(^{nd}\) Air Rescue Group provided two SA-16’s, two H-19 helicopters, and a paramedic team, and these planes and people were organized at Pohang Airfield as Detachment 2, 3\(^{rd}\) Air Rescue Group.]\(^{68}\)

The most overreaching conclusion having correctness is both air rescue and classified air units (air commando, special mission, special operations) in Korea had overlying overt, covert and clandestine mission utilizations. However, the certainty of classified air units functioning under jurisdiction of the Covert, Clandestine and Related Activities in Korea (CCRAK) is less certainly established for aircrews, aircraft and paramedic (pararescue) teams of the 3\(^{rd}\) Rescue Squadron.

[November 28, 1951: The Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) established an organization known as Covert, Clandestine and Related Activities in Korea (CCRAK) and charged it to function as a "single headquarters ... to direct all Army, Navy, and CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) operations of this nature in Korea."\(^{69}\)]

Several communications between HQ Air Rescue Service and 3\(^{rd}\) Rescue Squadron express unhappiness pararescue personnel were flying missions on special mission aircraft with expressed desire to find a way to stop this utilization, but apparently to no avail. Unfortunately, the communications provide no insight into the specifics of what airborne duties and activities on the aircraft pararescue personnel were there to do.

Special operations air assets during the Korean War were given the wartime capability purpose of supporting forces behind enemy lines and of preparing, reproducing and disseminating psychological warfare materials. Aircraft and aircrews of the 21\(^{st}\) Troop Carrier Squadron and the 581\(^{st}\) Air Resupply and Communications Wing (AR&CW) were the primary units involved in doing such activities and missions. Cargo aircraft from a CIA-controlled civilian airline were used to support the guerrilla forces in Korea and to insert and extract agents from Manchuria in Communist China.\(^{70}\) The U.S. Air Force-CIA relationship throughout the war was particularly profitable, close, and cordial.\(^{71}\) However by August 1953, US policy formally prohibited the CIA from sending Americans on covert overflights.\(^{72}\)

Most of the clandestine and covert sorties flown were to support Korean partisan forces and Korean agents. The indigenous Asian population created much difficulty for European (Caucasian) insurgent forces, guerilla forces, partisan forces and agents to blend in as being somebody who belonged there. US Army Ranger companies during the Korean War were usually employed as just another company or as a sort of fire brigade for the division commander rather than in the raiding force role initially envisioned.\(^{73}\)
Detachment 2, 21st Troop Carrier Squadron (C-47) and, after July 1952, the 581st AC&RW (B-29, B-17, SA-16 & H-19) supplied the aircraft and aircrew mostly used to infiltrate and extract partisan Korean and Chinese intelligence agents (1950-1953) and partisan airborne forces (1951-1953).  

The actual crew complement on each aircraft beyond pilot(s), navigator, flight engineer or crew chief, radio operator and perhaps loadmaster it is left to speculation. There is certainty though that airdrops of partisans required presence of a jumpmaster. Additionally trained kickers were needed for airdrops of supplies and any ground-to-air fixed wing snatching using the All American System also required additional trained personnel onboard the aircraft.

The necessity to use aircraft to extract mostly partisan agents was caused by both the lack of radios to give to the agents and that the excessive bulk and weight of before solid-state circuits made radio unsuitable for guerrilla warfare.

Regardless, both the insertion and extraction operation had significant risks of flying into danger. Double agents could slip through the screening process or agents could be captured and interrogated. The information obtained by the enemy subsequently being used to lure an extraction aircraft and aircrew into a pickup location ambush.

[Arriving over the unmarked DZ, the C-46 slowed to drop speed and the first of two Chinese agents parachuted out into the night. Hesitating just before he jumped, the second agent lobbed a live grenade into the forward cabin section. The agent was safely out the door under an opening parachute when the grenade exploded, instantly killing or disabling the four remaining Chinese agents and one of the two American jumpmasters. With the aircraft on fire and coming apart in midair, Capt Lawrence E. Burger, the instructor navigator, stayed at the controls to allow the surviving crew members to jump to safety. The crew members were captured shortly after landing. … The full story of the treachery did not become known until the repatriation of the captured crew at the end of the war.]
[In late April 1953 the team [Green Dragon] reported that five downed US airmen were with the unit, and additional supplies and men (56 or 57) were dropped. An attempt was then made to rescue the US airmen by a “snatch’ pickup, but the pickup aircraft was met by intense AA fire at the rendezvous location and did not proceed with the mission.]78

The risks certainly demanded presence of a crewmember in the cargo area providing some level of security protection. The parachute airdrop insertion of agents and potential All American System extraction methods certainly required somebody to train the agent to parachute at minimum. The lack of a drop-zone reception party marking the DZ and being there to receive the agents certainly required a skilled and experience jumpmaster. Few if any histories address these specifics.

[In March 1951, the 442d set up a training school at Pusan that provided 20 agents at a time with a basic two-week course of instruction. (The facility moved to Taegu in June.)… October 1951, Centralized training was revived when three nets were consolidated and a new school set up in Seoul. Ultimately, a compromise between the two approaches was reached: the nets provided basic agent training and the school became responsible for advanced radio and parachute training]79

[One of the major problems in airdropping supplies was poorly marked or inaccessible drop zones. No small part of these troubles was caused by the ground troops' lack of training in airdrop procedures.]80

Although providing survival training to aircrews gets mention, insufficient detail is given to disclosing how adequate and sufficient this training was. It is clear however the training wasn’t to the degree of required extensive survival training given to pararescue personnel. Further both Army and Air Force identified a significant prevalent throughout the Korean War problem of obtaining enough of the right skills in the form of trained service members. Pararescue personnel were trained and proficient in more than enough of the right skills being in high demand for accomplishing special operations missions.

[… qualified as parachutists, these individuals are the spear heading land rescue and evacuation party. … In addition to the hourly requirements listed below each team member will demonstrate proficiency monthly in sending and receiving six (6) words per minute CW by code groups and four (4) WPM blinker by code groups. … each team member being a potential team leader of an untrained land rescue party, must be highly proficient as a land navigator. … Each team member will receive indoctrination as a jumpmaster. … It is not required that a free fall jump be made for training purposes; however, one free fall jump per team member is authorized per year if such is desired by the team member …]81

Historical records frequently do not identify enlisted personnel utilized in specific roles unless an unusual event draws such attention. There is definitely an absolute lack of primary written source documents to give any certainty of the identity of jumpmasters and airborne trainers. However, two retired Pararescue NCOs82 who were in Korea for the duration of the war during
an interview gave testimonial evidence they and some other pararescue personnel were involved in such activities. Considering much of the detailed information disclosed during these interviews were yet to be declassified or mentioned in published books there is extremely strong force of probability pararescue personnel were flying special operations missions and rescue missions on other than Air Rescue Service aircraft and had involvement with establishing E&E routes and planned but cancelled prisoner of war liberation raids.

Although the deactivation of the 581st at Kadena AB in September 1956, closed the book on the long-range unconventional warfare mission around which the ARCS and its associated wings were based other Air Force flying units continued to be involved in the conducting and accomplishing of special missions.

- OTHER SPECIAL MISSIONS -

The Cold War (ca. 1947 to ca. 1994) found the highly specialized training and qualifications of USAF Pararescue personnel significantly suitable and available for roles and missions other than the rescue aiding and assisting of survivors of crashed aircraft. Published histories seldom document the specifics Air Rescue air assets and Pararescue personnel participation. Similar in utilization nature during the Korean War, Pararescue personnel utilization continued to be satisfying requirements having a nonstandard nature. Nonstandard meaning Pararescue personnel being assigned to an air rescue in nature having tasking to support requirements other than air rescue and/or Pararescue personnel becoming non-unit-related personnel assigned to one unit but accomplishing missions with other units.

[The MATS Air Rescue Service also had a terrific load to carry. Air Rescue Service forces provided daily precautionary coverage in support of reconnaissance and fighter missions by Tactical Air Command, Navy and Strategic Air Command aircraft. They provided actual search activities in an attempt to locate a downed SAC reconnaissance aircraft. And Air Rescue Service helicopters provided fire suppression and local base rescue support at five of the buildup bases.]83

Around November 1954, the first three Air Force C-119 aircrews were qualified to perform in air recoveries for the Gentex/Weapon System 119L program.84 The midair recovery involved snagging an equipment gondola descending by parachute after being released from an extreme high altitude balloon. The unit later known as the 6594th Test Group was activated on 1 November 1959 to catch film canisters descending by parachute after being jettisoned from orbiting Corona/Discovery project satellites. It was not until the Discoverer XIII capsule came down on 11 August 1960 that the Test Squadron actually had a chance to effect a recovery. The Test Squadron was not able to snag the capsule in mid-air, but it was able to locate it after it splashed down in the Pacific Ocean, and the capsule was recovered from the water by Navy personnel.85 Just as recovery techniques evolved over time, the programs supported by these techniques changed as well. The Discoverer Program was succeeded by other programs.86

These included NASAs Biosatellite program, the Atomic Energy Commissions Project Ashcan, the Army’s Designating Optical Tracker (DOT) program, and the Air Force’s Advanced Ballistic Reentry Systems (ABRES) and Balloon Altitude Mosaic Measurements (BAMM) programs.
The pararescue utilization resulted from if the air recovery could not be effected, surface recovery was attempted.

[However, when the Discoverer XV capsule hit the water 1,000 miles south of the predicted impact point, naval vessels were unable to reach it before it sank. To prevent this from happening again, a new and faster surface recovery technique was devised and was employed in the next surface recovery--that of the Discoverer XXV capsule on 19 June 1961. An SC-54 Rescuemaster aircraft flew to the spot where the capsule had come down, and three para-rescuemen of the Air Rescue Service parachuted into the water, swam over to the capsule, inflated a raft, and secured the capsule to it. They remained in position until the next morning, when they and their cargo were picked up by the LSS Radford. Both methods of surface recovery--recovery by helicopters operating off ships, and recovery by pararescue people jumping out of aircraft--continued in use. The first method constituted the primary method of recovery and the second method constituted the secondary, back-up method.]^87

Air Force Regulation 50-24, 23 May 1988, in prescribing the mission of the Air Rescue Service directs the “Air Rescue Service will also assist in retrieving and safeguarding hazardous cargoes (special weapons) in accordance with AFR 55-14.” Fulfilling this mission required surface operations capabilities.

Expanding strategic reconnaissance demand to global regions other than the Soviet Union and China had created concerns hazardous cargos, balloon gondolas, satellite film capsules and military aircraft crashes would happen in remote high elevation locations of the Andes, Himalayas and other mountain ranges. These concerns resulted in the 71st ARRS Pararescue Team at Elmendorf AFB to train-up and maintain a permanent rapid global deployable High Altitude Rescue Team from 1977 to 1980. This was the first such expedition climbing capability existing in all of DOD.

Throughout the Cold War, the Air Force continued to fly reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft (U-2, SR-71, RB-50 RB-57, RB-47, DC-130, P2V and other MDS aircraft). During the period 1949-1960, there were 32 airborne reconnaissance missions flown which resulted in international incidents and the loss of 13 manned aircraft platforms. Air Rescue aircraft and aircrews either prepositioned at a remote airfield or flew precautionary orbits at the entry and exit over fly points. Pararescue personnel were on these aircraft prepared to execute a rescue if necessary.

[March 15, 1960: after several days of searching, a C-47 (43-48899) crash location was found about 300 feet below a mountain summit in the central Apennine mountain range about 4.1 miles southeast of Amatrice Italy. All four souls onboard were clearly deceased. A pararescue team jumped to the crash site from a 58th ARS (Wheelus AB, Libya) SC-54 to secure the classified information known to be on the crashed C-47.]^89

The cold war particularly during the 1950s and 1960s is a period during which primarily the Soviet Bloc, but also the People’s Republic of China (PRC), shrewdly undercut objectives of the United Nations and the United States in third world regions around the world for purposes of
obtaining political dominant influence in these regions. Concurrently the closing down of military installations overseas which brought with it military forces withdrawal, particularly from the third world regions, drove more reliance using mixed civilian-military teams or on the capabilities of completely on civilian led agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agencies. Whatever the reason, when certain human performance operational capability was needed, pararescue personnel in some way got volunteered to fill the void.

- THE BELGIAN CONGO CRISIS -

The Belgian Congo crisis/Congolese civil war (1960-1964) was a violent regional conflict with significant Cold War entanglements. Four years of anarchy in the region began with a mutiny in the Congolese Army on 6 July 1960. The final months of UN involvement saw many small operations to rescue civilians taken hostage or otherwise caught in the ongoing anarchy and mayhem. The 1964 end of the crisis is a significant paradox as the last months of 1964 only identifies the change of American national policy willingness and commitments to intervene in the Congo, now Zaire.

The United Nations (UN) at the request of the Congo’s central government in 1960 favoured aiding the government with stipulation no great power troops were permitted in force. Thus the largest military presence came from India with the United States sending aid overtly through the United Nations and other normal diplomatic channels and covertly through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).90

The region being a former Belgian colonial possession made it much more a Belgian burden in standings of having the significantly greatest in number foreign national community in the region to protect. The United States policy decision and efforts were to avoid, if not prevent, deployment of U.S. ground forces into the region. The United States committing military airlift support to Belgian (NATO) and United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces was the most prominent overt avoid involvement exception.

[Operation NEW TAPE, the largest USAF airlift since the Berlin Airlift of 1948-49, covered much greater distances and carried more tons per aircraft … It supported the largest deployment of UN troops since the Korean War. In duration and in ton-miles, Operation NEW TAPE surpassed even the vaunted Berlin Airlift. MATS alone moved 63,899 passengers and 18,806 tons of cargo among at least 24 nations in the 4 years between July 1960 and June 1964.]91

United States covert actions (CA) in form of the Civilian Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the region originate with the CIA complement at Leopoldville Station being opened in 1951. This station was given responsibility for covering most of equatorial Africa.92 Operations initially focusing on political actions to quell provincial rebellions quickly expanded to provide tactical support to UN peacekeepers, Congolese forces, and mercenaries fighting the insurgents with overreaching goal to ensure the U.S. military wouldn’t become involved. The CIA engaged in conducting multiplying multifaceted covert action (CA) and para-military operations as the stability in the region deteriorated. These activities were dealing with regime change, political action, propaganda, air and marine operations, and arms interdiction.
[At its height, the CIA air force in the Congo would include thirteen T-28s and seven B-26K bombers, as well as C-47 transport aircraft, two small twin-engine liaison planes, and H-21 helicopters.]^93

Although larger and faster cargo aircraft allowed great distances to be flown into the Congo region from location in Europe and the United States and back once refueled, once the aircraft entered in airspace over the Africa continent, the aircrews were entering in a harsh risky flying environment with significant potential exposure to hostile threat and intentions once the aircraft landed.\(^94\)

[At Stanleyville on August 27, 1960, an augmented C-124 crew of fourteen was severely beaten in Stanleyville. Some members suffered fractured skulls and broken limbs. The exact motive for the beatings was never determined. As a result, crews were ordered to keep their personal firearms available for use, but out of sight.]^95

The map to the right gives appreciation of the distances flown over the African continent. The distances fail to give awareness of the time needed to get aircraft and aircrew headed back on the return trip. Neither does the map depict the lack of basic air traffic control operations, weather forecasting and absence of navigational aids along the routes once over the African continent.

All the airfields in the region were also constrained in capacity to handle the landing and parking of the increased airlift arriving at the airfield. Not only did the larger airfields lack adequate air traffic control capabilities,\(^96\) many of the larger airfields also lacked the ramp space to accommodate more than three C-130 sized aircraft. The majority of the airfields in the region had runways of unsuitable lengths and widths to land C-130 sized and larger aircraft on. These factors significantly limited the highest number of aircraft that can be put on the ground during a given span of time to put troops on the ground or to deliver food.
Various squadrons of the Air Rescue Service, primarily the 58th Air Rescue Squadron, Wheelus AB, Libya maintained a constant presence to cover airlift and air evacuation air operations into and out of the Belgian Congo. The 58th ARS initially established, during July 1960, a forward operating location at Leopoldville, which quickly relocated to Accra, Ghana until the latter months of 1961 when it was relocated to Kano, Nigeria.

[It may have begun, for Rescue, as early as 4/7/60. … Bob Johnson and I had just returned to an empty section from an eight day search over the Barents Sea North of Norway for the crew of an RB-47 (shot down and picked up by the Ruskies) when on the night of our return, July 5th 1960, we were rousted out of bed to join an SC-54 crew being dispatched to Leopoldville in the Congo to cover the evacuation of several thousand Belgians who were being forced out, after several generation, by the rebellion of the black Congolese Army. … Meanwhile our crew commander, Capt Gene C. Tyner had a talk with the SABENA Station Manager. He gave us the full possession, temporarily as it turned out, of one of their 707 maintenance hangers. … We pulled the '54 into the hanger, borrowed some desks and African Nav and sectional (such as they were) charts from SABENA. We had no comm with anybody, not even HF using an SABENA radio tower. This problem was solved on day four with the arrival of a C-130 and a five man Comm Team. The "Herky Bird" was from the 322nd AD based at Châteauroux Air Base, France. The Comm Team came complete with brand new, state of the art Collins Single Side band radio transceivers, fresh from the factory and they were with the 5th USAF Mobile (MOB) Communications Squadron. … About ten days into our deployment the other side of the hanger became the Command Post for a battalion of Belgian "Force d' Frap" (read Commandos) who had finally arrived in country to lead the loyal ???? balance of the Congolese Army against the revolutionary movement. …. Bob and I stayed through the first rotation of about three weeks and were replaced by, I believe, Marty Juback and Eddie Moak.]

U.S. National policy not only intensely pursued avoiding the introduction of any combat units into the Congo, but also strongly deterred, if not prohibited the use of U.S. military personnel in military or paramilitary operations to maintain security (law and order) in the Congo. However, Pararescue personnel were highly trained survivalists, medics, and precision parachutists. Furthermore, considering the range, versatility and durability of the SA-16s flown by the 58th ARS combined with abundance of large lakes and rivers allowing it to land where the larger military cargo planes couldn’t does establish probability of humanitarian evacuation and rescue missions being flown on a case by case basis in support of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (UNOC).

[July 8, 1960: By way of Brazzaville and Paris, Ambassador Timberlake reported that the immediate need was for helicopters and light planes to bring Americans in from the outlying areas. The J-3 "task force" at once arranged with USCINCEUR for three helicopters from Germany and one from Wheelus Field, Tripoli, to be flown to Brazzaville in C-124 transports. The first one arrived the next day and the others followed soon afterward. The four transport planes and
another that had been sent on ahead as a "pilot" plane were placed under the operational control of the Ambassador for evacuation flights, and three attache aircraft in neighboring countries were made available for the same use if needed. ... Ambassador Timberlake had put in a request for Air Force operations and survival personnel and for communications equipment and technicians to be sent to the Kamina airfield; …][99

There is no evidence suggesting or inferring pararescue personnel provided any support to the CIA activities in the region. However, an Air Rescue Service H-21 helicopter was brought into the Belgian Congo from Germany during July 1960 for CIA operations.100 Regardless, there was involvement in some way with several noncombat evacuation operations and several humanitarian search and rescue incidents.

[July 19, 1960: A C-119 of the 15th Transport Wing leaves the airfield of Bujumbura (Burundi) for Bunia (Congo). Halfway in the flight, one of the engines fails and burns out. The remaining engine however does not provide sufficient power to pass over the mountains at Sake Massisi (75 kilometers northwest of Goma). The airplane crashes into the mountainside and catches fire. The entire crew and 36 of the 40 passengers perish.]

[May 17, 1962: A C-130A (56-0546) transporting support personnel and equipment for the recovery team of the Aurora 7, the second American manned orbital flight, crashed into a mountain in poor weather in the Ngong Mountain Region near Nairobi Kenya on 17 May 1962. The pararescue personnel were awarded the Airman’s Medal for disregarding their safety for entering the still smoldering wreckage to search for and rescue any trapped survivors as it was teetering to drop over a 2,000-foot cliff drop.]

[September 20, 1962: A UN operated Transair Sweden DC-3 was shot down by Congolese forces near the railway station at Kamonza in the Congo.]

The withdrawal of the last UN troops on 30 June 1964 was swiftly followed by capture of Stanleyville by an insurgent rebel regime during the first week or two of August 1964. The capture of Stanleyville also involved the purposeful taking of 330 European hostages. About two dozen Americans were among the hostages of which were U.S. Consul Michael Hoyt and his four aides. Shortly after their capture, the CIA began contemplating different methods to secure their release or escape, but the necessary forward staging area could not be defended and held.

[The first attempt at a rescue, known as Operation Flag Pole, called for the CIA and military personnel based at the Embassy in Leopoldville to participate in a helicopter rescue mission. … But, before it could be put into effect, this operation was canceled.][101

A second attempt planned to utilize Joint Task Force Leo proved to be to be impractical since American missionaries could not be left behind in rebel-held territory. Politically it was feared
that a creeping commitment in the Congo could hurt presidential re-election campaigning and ruin support for a Gulf of Tonkin resolution in the U.S. Senate.102

[August 11, 1964: Joint Task Force (JTF) Leo, a United States Strike Command task force consisting primarily of three Tactical Air Command C-130s and support personnel, deploy to Leopoldville. The transports were from the 464th Troop Carrier Wing, Pope AFB, adjacent to Fort Bragg, N.C. A platoon of paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division provided protection for the C-130s while they were on the ground at remote African airstrips. A fourth C-130 was part of Leo, a 'Talking Bird' communications package that allowed long-range radio communications. JTF LEO remained in Leopoldville until August 1965.]103

For the next four months (111 days), the rebels tormented the hostages while the US government, African leaders, and the International Red Cross negotiated unsuccessfully for their release. During the course of the negotiations an aggressive joint U.S.-Belgian military airborne assault rescue plan was developed and subsequently put into action during November 1964.

The option of a Joint Task Force (JTF) with concept of using an airborne assault and establishing an airhead to ensure subsequent air landing of aircraft to remove the rescued hostages and withdraw the entire airborne assault force was decided upon.

It was carefully specified in the Operations Plan that the U.S. military involvement was to end when its aircraft (C-130Es) was to end when all that was to be delivered was delivered and when the evacuation of the hostages and withdrawal of the assault force was completed.

The only mention of Air Rescue Service assets to be found is vague mentions of U.S. Air Force was to provide air-sea rescue support to the operations. It is documented one Air Rescue HC-97 was positioned at Ascension and a second Air Rescue HC-97 at Leopoldville. Unfortunately no mention is found in available documents of 58th ARS aircraft or of 58th ARS pararescue personnel being on the ground at Stanleyville.
The Air Force. The U.S. Air Force was to provide air-sea rescue facilities to support the operation; position search and rescue aircraft at Ascension Island during deployment operations; provide en route weather briefings and other weather informational support as required; and arrange for en route airbase support for operations planned through Ascension Island, including the best available messing and billeting facilities for the U.S. aircrews and Belgian paratroopers.]\textsuperscript{104}

The airborne assault, Codenamed DRAGON ROUGE,\textsuperscript{105} to rescue the hostages airdropped 340 Belgian para-commandos from U.S. Air Force C-130s over the Stanleyville airport at 0600hrs on November 24, 1964. After clearing water drums, wrecked vehicles, and other obstructions from the runway the C-130s landed another 280 commandos at the airport.

At 0740 hours the lead elements of the commandos entered the outskirts of Stanleyville, about 3 kilometers from the airport and began a street by street street-by-street rescue move through the city while engaging in sporadic firefights with disappearing rebels. At 0945 the first plane took off for Leopoldville with 120 evacuees. Roughly 1,500 foreign nationals and 150 Congolese civilians will be evacuated to Leopoldville within a 36 hour period.

[An SA-16 from the 58\textsuperscript{th} with PJs as medics and two 322\textsuperscript{nd} Air Division C-130s were the last three aircraft to land at Stanleyville to evacuate Belgian nuns and children before the airport was attacked by rebels. One of the C-130s took a hit on approach, and the crew chief had to make a field modification to both wingtips before it could take off.]\textsuperscript{106}

DRAGON NOIR, a second airborne assault rescue mission, is conducted at Paulis on November 26, 1964. This operation saved more than 200 hostages. Sensitive to the public condemnation of the intervention in the international media, the United States and Belgian governments decided not to pursue the other two rescue operations—DRAGON VERT in Watsa and DRAGON BLANC in Bunia.\textsuperscript{107}

The Congo crisis is considered over, and it is pertinent to it being considered a situation of economic, political or military importance that potentially necessitated continued or new in the future commitment of U.S. military forces and resources.

- POTENTIAL DIPLOMATIC/INTERNATIONAL BORDER INCIDENT AVERTED -

During the last few day of January 1967 the crew of an HC-54 (58\textsuperscript{th} ARS, Wheelus AB, Libya) en route to Turkey is diverted to Tehran, Iran. Iranian and American Embassy officials meet the HC-54 after it lands and informs them a U.S. Army U-1A Otter aircraft with five souls onboard had crashed at the 15,000 foot elevation of a mountain on the Iran/Russian border in the Zargos mountain range (another designation is the Kurdish Mountains). These officials further explained that a high-level intelligence officer is on-board and the Russians would love to capture him, and probably already have a team headed to the crash site. Not only were five lives at stake, but a potential International incident should the intelligence officer be captured needed to be avoided. The HC-54 arrived over the crash location finding conditions on the mountain thirty below zero with forty-knot winds. Both Pararescuemen jump, even though the HC-54 pilots
thought it crazy and suicidal to do so. Both Pararescuemen end up on ledges a few thousand yards apart. The terrain is so rugged they can’t make radio contact with each other. After battling the elements and terrain for three days, an Iranian ground team arrives and the now combined rescue teams continue to the crash site. Three of the five survivors froze to death while attempting to move down the mountain. At the crash site, only the intelligence officer (Col Vann, Chief of Intelligence, Military Advisor Iran) and an Army Specialist 4 are found alive and successfully rescued.

Although these special missions were not within or behind enemy lines, they are representative of numerous other missions accomplished in International waters or crossing of international borders in nature. Once employed out of the aircraft to the water or land surface to effect a surface recovery of survivors or materiel, the pararescue personnel were potentially at risk of entering a SERE environment.

**- HELICOPTER OPERATIONS IN AREA 51, SEPTEMBER 1962 - JUNE 1967 -**

Area 51 (aka Groom Lake and Paradise Ranch) was added to the Atomic Energy Commission’s Nevada real estate holdings in April 1955 and by July 1955 a paved airstrip and facilities existed having purpose for development testing-and-evaluation and subsequent initial operational test and evaluation of CIA and Air Force high altitude reconnaissance aircraft (Project AQUATONE).¹⁰⁸

Documents disclosing what if any rescue and survival operational capability existed to support Project AQUATONE are lacking. However the 25 June 2013 declassification and public release of the “Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974” reveal Air Force physicians Colonel William Randolph Lovelace, II and Colonel Donald D. Flickinger were advising the Central Intelligence Agency on high-altitude survival.¹⁰⁹

Both Loveless and Flickinger made daring parachute jumps from B-47 bombers during the early 1950s to test pilot-survival gear under extreme conditions. Dr. Loveless began his parachuting career while on active duty during WWII by doing a bailout from an aircraft 40,200 feet above Washington State on June 24, 1943. Dr. Flickinger’s survival and parachuting expertise was gained in the CBI Theater by leading a parachute rescue team that rescued the crew and passengers of C-46 that went down in Japanese occupied territory in the CBI Theater in August 1943. Prior to becoming involved with Project AQUATONE as Chief of the Air Force School of Applied Tactics, Orlando Florida he developed and established the Army Air Forces’ first survival school and was closely involved with others in developing and establishing the USAF Pararescue career field. Flickinger served as the medical adviser to Project AQUATONE for almost a decade.¹¹⁰

Project OXCART development testing-and-evaluation and subsequent initial operational test and evaluation activities of the A-12 and SR71 aircraft in Area 51 was during the period from 1962 to 1967.

Project OXCART coincides with the September 1962 establishing of Detachment 1, 1129th USAF Special Activities Squadron. The Detachment’s mission capabilities supported an
assortment of activities and mission needs from high altitude facility construction to search and rescue, to teaching survival. The detachment’s rescue and survival branch had four pararescue personnel assigned. This branch ran a survival school for the A-12 pilots and others, which included desert, jungle, seacoasts, and mountain training sites, parasail training at Lake Mead, water survival, and a pistol firing range.

The four Pararescuemen, Earl Casto, Gordon Bailey, Fred Schneider, and Coy Staggs provided SERE training to the pilots and flew SAR support for the area 51 aircraft. Documents disclose responsibilities included testing equipment pressure suits, floatation devices and survival procedures with the pilots. MSgt Casto jumped out of a C-130 at a high altitude to test the A-12 pilots' pressure suit and was awarded a medal for his efforts. The Detachment’s rescue and survival branch also conducted parasail training on Lake Mead. The four Pararescuemen provided SERE instruction and field training at several training locations (most locations were previously used by the 2156th Air Rescue Squadron, 1950-1953). This training was specifically conducted to help prepare the new A-12 pilot cope with his mission. Some of the basic SERE training deemed necessary included coping with landing in water while wearing the pressure suit, parachute landing, survival off-the-land, jungle survival, seacoast survival and resistance to interrogation.

- SOUTHEAST ASIA CONFLICTS OF 1961-1975 -
- THE UTILIZATION PATTERN CONTINUES –

The largest paramilitary operations ever undertaken by the CIA took place in the small Southeast Asian Kingdom of Laos. The Geneva Accords of 1962 (Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos) forced the United States to withdraw its 666 military advisers and support staff, from Laos. By the last months of 1963 it had become clear North Vietnam was not complying with the agreement. By January 1964 actions were being undertaken to counter North Vietnamese army forces conducting military operations in Laos.

[After the Bay of Pigs failure, President Kennedy had determined to make the Department of State the central point, below the President, in the conduct of foreign affairs. On 29 May 61, Kennedy sent a letter to each US Ambassador working abroad stating that they were in charge of all operations of the US Diplomatic Mission, also including “representatives of all other United States agencies”, that is also including all CIA operations. In that letter, only the US military forces operating in the field were excluded, provided that “such forces are under the command of a United States area military commander.” But officially, Laos was neutral and there was no US military in Laos, and so there was no such “area military commander” either. Consequently, by this letter of President Kennedy dated 29 May 61, the US Ambassador to Laos became the controlling authority for all aspects of the war in Laos; he was the man who was really in charge of the entire war in Laos.]

Names and military occupation seldom appear in documents relatable to the Military Assistance Programs and other government agencies activities in Laos unless something significant is involved. It appears putting Pararescuemen in special operations was limited to eight pararescue
personnel during 1964. Headquarters Air Rescue Service transferred these Pararescuemen to the Air Commando Wing, Hurlburt Field, Florida mid-1964. This transfer appears to have some connection to Secretary of Defense McNamara approving on March 5, 1964 the assignment of Detachment 6, 1st Commando Wing to Udorn (Waterpump).\textsuperscript{114}

[Ambassador William Sullivan wanted Project 404 personnel to have a Special Operations background to support his air operations; that is why he selected the Air Commandos to fill his requirement. “Individuals in Project 404 were assigned to out of country units and their in-country existence was classified for most of the 1966-73 period. Being in the Black allowed personnel to perform military duties as a civilian operating in Laos under the supervision of AIRA (Air Attaché).]\textsuperscript{115}

Much uncertainty exists regarding the specific utilization and operational need purpose causing the transfer. The operational utility unquestionably involved either performing duties in an Agency outside the Department of Defense with the intent of returning to the Department of Defense upon completion of those duties, or to backfill with a capability Air Force special operations units had unavailable to deploy. Pictures in several proprietary archives and numerous documents mention senior pararescue NCOs of the Air Rescue Service being involved with Project 404, PALACE DOG, air operations in Laos at five sites: Vientiene the Capital, Pakse, Savanneket, in Southern or SteelTiger Region, Long Tieng, Luang Prabang, in the Northern or Barrel Roll Region. At least one pararescue NCO, TSgt Monnie, had Forward Air Guide training and controlled air strikes in Laos in addition to performing paramedic duties.\textsuperscript{116} There is also mention of at least one the Air Rescue Service paramedics making significant excursions into Laos with the Royal Lao Army’s Hmong guerrilla forces.

[So, when the Water Pump detachment arrived at Udorn in 1964, they began to run a medical service for the Thai villages surrounding Udorn, transporting medical supplies to the villages and ill people to the Udorn hospital by a truck. The second Water Pump team, which arrived at Udorn in late 64, brought still more medical personnel to Udorn, and they even operated as medical doctors in Laos, for example at Savannakhet (L-39).]\textsuperscript{117}

[Dispensaries were usually staffed by a medic who was trained and paid by A.I.D., although occasionally a Government or military medic was available: Medicine was furnished by the A.I.D. Mission.]\textsuperscript{118}

[As to the T-28s, they belonged to the USAF’s Air Commando Detachment called Water Pump or to the USAF’s Military Assistance Program for Thailand/Laos, but were flown by Air America pilots in the Tango Program. And since that time, Air America had a permanent new task: the rescue of US military pilots shot down over Laos and later even over North Vietnam, and so, in July 64, the Company received 4 more UH-34Ds for rescue work and the contract between Air America and US Air Force was changed to include military rescue work.]\textsuperscript{119}

The other strong probability is in the early years of the military, the downed aircrews were picked up by Air America helicopters and later also by USAF SAR teams.\textsuperscript{120} Much of the SAR
responsibility for downed U.S. Armed Forces aircrews in Laos transferred to or rather was passed to Air Rescue Service assets beginning in 1965. At this time Air America rescue operations began working together with the Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) at Udorn (call-sign “Compress”). The Air Force RCC having primary primarily responsible for the recovery of military aircrews in Laos and North Vietnam would then direct Detachment 2, 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron (ARRS), flying H-3 “Jolly Green Giants” out of Nakhon Phanom and/or the 40th Aerospace Rescue Squadron flying (depending on year H-3/H-53) Jolly Green Giants out of Udorn.\textsuperscript{121}

[There were two legal links between the “Ravens”, who were USAF men assigned to a secret USAF program, and Air America: One of them was rescue – Air America helicopters also picked up Raven pilots who had been downed – and the other one was maintenance.]\textsuperscript{122}

[“We agree with your assessment of importance SAR operations, that Air America pilots can play critically important role, and that SAR efforts should not discriminate between rescuing Americans, Thais of Lao. You are hereby granted as requested discretionary authority to use AA pilots in T-28s for SAR operations when you consider this indispensable to success of operation and with understanding that you will seek advance Washington authorization wherever situation permits”.]\textsuperscript{123}

[Na Khang (LS-36). Located in the north, 150 nautical miles west of Hanoi, it had always been of strategic importance to the United States, as it served as a forward staging area for US Search and Rescue operations which tried to reach downed aircrews before they were captured. USAF “Jolly Green Giant” helicopters waited at Na Khang to pick up US aircrews downed over North Vietnam or Laos.]\textsuperscript{124}

[Late 1965, USAF HH-3E “Jolly Green Giants” were being based at Na Khang (LS-36) for Search and Rescue duties.]\textsuperscript{125}

Assigning personnel to Water Pump units in Laos was done originally on a 6-month temporary duty basis.\textsuperscript{126} After 1966, permanent personnel from Nakhon Phanom were used in Laos.\textsuperscript{127} Organizationally Water Pump by 1966 had become part of the 56th Air Commando Wing at Nakhon Phanom, and on 4 August 1968, the 56th ACW changed its name to become the 56th Special Operations Wing at Nakhon Phanom.\textsuperscript{128}

It is difficult, if not impossible; to determine the names of the pararescue personnel the Air Rescue Service transferred to special operations during 1964. The only certainty is such utilization was limited to a small group of experienced NCOs. No information has surfaced to establish transfer of pararescue personnel from the Air Rescue Service to special operations happening for such purposes after 1964. Only the names of four of the eight are known. They are Sergeants James H. “Rip” Collins, Frank Dean, Stan Monnie and Rick Chapman. Of the eight, only two are found mentioned in any document or history.
MSgt Francis C. Dean (Frank/Big Dean) served as a pararescueman 1947-1964. He is a WWII and a Korean War combat veteran. Considering he lacks an Air Rescue unit assignment after 1964.

The picture on the right appears with caption. “Air Commando medic MSgt Frank Dean, in civilian clothes for his tour in Laos, assists in off-loading wounded Laotian Forces Army Royale (FAR) soldier following battle in Paske, Laos, in 1969.”

The wearing of civilian clothing to perform his duties is a telltale sign he is working for an entity other than the United States Air Force. Either MSgt Dean was performing duties in an Agency outside the Department of Defense with the intent of returning to the Department of Defense upon completion of those duties; or, he had reclassified into a medical AFSC and had become an Air Commando medic attached to the civic action program of the 56th ACW.

Stanley M. Monnie (Stan/Monty) served as a pararescueman 1953-1964. He lacks an Air Rescue unit assignment after 1964. There are proprietary copyrighted photographs of him in Laos that identify him as an Air Force paramedic performing paramedic duties with an agency outside the Department of Defense.

[We had a para-medic that was in Air Rescue Service for years and years and was working in that capacity with the Air Commando Wing.]

[And on several occasions TSgt Stan Monnie—our para-rescue man who also had FAG training—would control strikes.]

[Well there was Frank Drew, Glenn Duke, Grant McNaughton, Stan Monnie, Jack Teague, and myself (Grimes). Those were the Water Pump personnel in Laos at the time.]

[A Commando Capt. Teague and a medic named Stan Monnie had made significant excursions into Laos with Vang Pao's guys, and "the Agency."]

The accounts gathering dust in various historical archives reveal insufficient information to suggest specifically how and where the USAF Pararescueman specialty specifically married up to a posture response to special operations needs in Laos or any place else in Southeast Asia. What is certain is the 1965 buildup of U.S. combat air forces air assets in the region and the expansion of using U.S. military aircraft to do missions in Laotian airspace resulted in a concurrent buildup of Air Rescue Service (subsequently Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service) units in the region.
This combined with lacking need to replace the original eight most likely eliminated the mission need to assign additional pararescue personnel to Air Force special operations units.

Air Rescue HH-43B helicopters arrived at Nakhon Phanom AB Thailand the last week of June 1964. Although the arriving rescue service pilots were trained by Air America pilots who flew over Laos to support their mission. Unfortunately, due to the limited range of the HH-43 the Nakhon Phanom based helicopters were not able to provide search and rescue services for the Plain of Jars or areas southeast of Pakse in the Laotian panhandle. Air America planes and helicopters continued to provide primary search and rescue support in these areas until the July 6, 1965 arrival of two CH-3C helicopters at Nakhon Phanom.

Much similar to the overlap utilization that happened during the Korean War, air rescue and special operations units had overlaying utilization on behalf of all the strategic and tactical war-winning objectives during the Southeast Asia conflicts (1961-1975). This utilization overlap included many more missions than Son Tay prisoners rescue attempt (November 20, 1970), the evacuation of Saigon (April 29-30, 1975) and the Mayaguez incident (May 15, 1975).\textsuperscript{134}

\textbf{- HIGH ALTITUDE RESCUE TEAM –}

Pararescue personnel were trained and qualified to parachute to high elevation mountainous terrain since the feasibility of such operations were tested high in the Italian Alps near Solda, Italy during the last week of June 1952.\textsuperscript{135} However during the late 1970s as strategic reconnaissance air and space assets and strategic airlift was expanding frequent flight paths and airway paths over high altitude mountain ranges (Andes Range, Himalayan Range, Tien Shan Range, Karakorum Range, Atlas Range) caused concern potential aircraft crash beyond the range and capabilities of helicopters was highly probable. Putting a High Altitude Rescue Team (HART) in each theater or region however was both extremely expensive and utilization frequency inefficient. The solution was the Pararescue Team at Elmendorf AFB as the access to high altitude mountains were present in Alaska to train on and more importantly, the Elmendorf AFB crossroad location to both Asia and Europe provided the most effective deploy HART from to incident location.

The operational capability desired and developed was to have a globally deployable six to eight man expedition mountaineering rescue response team. Members of this team were expected to have the qualifications and capability to conduct operations on snow, ice, and rock at elevations up to 22,000 feet above sea level for a self-sufficient period of no less than 20 days.

The mountaineering High Altitude Rescue Team’s mission ready certification May-June 1978 ascent of the 20,320 foot summit of Mt McKinley Alaska resulted in the first and only mission ready high altitude mountaineering rescue team in the Air Force and in the Department of Defense.

This operational readiness evaluation resulted in the June 15, 1978 change 1 to the December 1, 1977 ARRSR 55-11 Pararescue Operational Regulation stating “The 41\textsuperscript{st} RWRW has the primary responsibility of maintaining by name, one eight-man high altitude team capable of recovering sensitive equipment.
Authorization for a second HART happened during 1989. The 1 August 1989 MACR 23-13, 1730th Pararescue Squadron identified Detachment 4, 1730th PRS RAF Woodbridge United Kingdom and Detachment 5 1730th PRS Elmendorf AFB AK are designated to conduct high altitude mountain rescue and recovery in support of US Air Force and theater requirements.

- RESCUE SPECIAL OPERATIONS LOW LEVEL -

During the 1980s events again result in certain circles of the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (formerly Air Rescue Service) changes in the turmoil in the geopolitical environments around the world was building new potential threats that were likely to be low-intensity conflicts having unconventional warfare nature. Simply, mainstream military leadership seriously began to contemplate and develop capabilities to fight on asymmetrical battlefields after the tragic DESERT ONE-OPERATION EAGLE CLAW failure (April 24-25, 1980). It needs to be noted the deployment of six 67th ARRS HH-53 helicopters, five 67th ARRS HC-130s and 67th ARRS pararescue personnel from RAF Woodbridge UK to Incirlik AB, Turkey on February 11, 1980 to provide additional U.S. military support for evacuation operations in Iran often gets overlooked in special operations oriented histories.136

Rescue Special Operations Low Level (R-SOLL) is a Combat Rescue Tactic/Technique developed to enhance the ability of ARRS forces to complete an assigned mission while increasing the survivability of aircraft and crews.137

The concepts of RSOLL operations included much attention to regain focus on obtain and sustaining pararescue surface operations capabilities. Aircraft alternate insertion and extraction tactics and methods expanded to include Sky Genie/STABO, FAST rope, helicopter repelling, rope ladder and low level single pass Calculated Air Release Point (CARP) parachute insertion tactics. Weapon upgrades included 40mm grenade launcher to M-16s/GAU-5 and night sighting capabilities such Aim Point and other emerging laser sighting technology. PJs were involve with hot refueling in either setting up the landed tanker at an austere landing strip or convenient road to fuel aircraft and vehicles or to establish with US Army Rangers a secure an forward hot refueling point from landed tanker perimeter immediately on landing (result of DESERT One failure). The hi-tech communications and navigation avionics upgrades to the helicopter also resulted in training pararescue personnel to use and given thermite grenades and other demolition munitions to ensure the classified avionics devices were destroyed should one of the aircraft go down within or behind enemy lines.

It was however, the breakthrough of finally convincing Air Force leadership to allow utilization of rated officers and intelligence officers as survivors during extended ground movement over adverse terrain during daylight and nighttime hours. This resulted in Red Flag 82-4 being the first time a fighter pilot and an intelligence officer were moved 50 plus miles under simulated behind enemy lines over adverse terrain at night for several nights.138 Several U.S. Army infantry and mechanized infantry companies were hunting for the survivors and the rescue team during the time the rescue team was locating and linking up with the survivors and moving the survivors overland to the helicopter extraction point. The aggressor forces did not capture the rescue team and survivors. The mission ended with a successful as planned during mission planning helicopter landing extraction at the primary designated extraction point.
Concurrent with development of RSOLL was the 1983 origins of 41st ARRS Pararescue personnel participating in various phases of RIDGE RUNNER escape and evasion exercises. It was the result of participating in these escape and evasion exercises that it became apparent Air Force survival school curriculums had become lacking in preparing pararescue students to perform SERE activities in the operational tactical ground environment. At this time, it was also recognized U.S. Army SERE schools and courses had the more comprehensive curriculums. The Army SERE curriculums and field exerciser are oriented towards instructing members of those small tactical teams that most often work behind enemy lines.

RSOLL and strategic special operations low level (SOLL) airlift (C-141/C-5) also resulted in pararescue personnel training to do combat missions out of Mission Design Series aircraft that were not designated search and rescue aircraft. Exercise Quick Force 84-3, April 1984, provides a combat search and rescue scenario example. The scenario involves an 1,800-mile infiltration by C-141 from Pope AFB using SOLL tactics from Pope AFB to the Gila Bend Gunnery Range for a night parachute insertion. Once on the ground a 110km of night tactical movement over a nine-day period with two airdrop resupplies to establish contact with and provide survival, medical, evasion, and recovery assistance to evaders from two separate areas was accomplished. RSOLL capable HH-53 aircraft executed exfiltration of the pararescue team and the evaders. The team accomplishes its exercise objective without succumbing to the extremes of the desert and mountainous terrains or being captured by the aggressor forces.139

RSOLL concept of operations were instrumental in the strike force rescue package supporting Freedom of the Seas/Eldorado Canyon (Attacks against forces in Libya) 12 Apr 86 - 17 Apr 86. This resulted in in eight pararescue personnel and 18 other crewmembers onboard two HH-53J Pave helicopters and one HC-130 tanker qualifying for and being presented the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal.140 Eligibility required being on the strike support rescue aircraft flying low level (below 500 feet AGL/MSL) patterns over the Libyan coast line before, during and after the strike force bombed designated targets in and around Tripoli. This part of the April 14, 1986 missing or downed 48th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) F-111 is a seldom-mentioned account of what happened.

- Special Tactics Squadrons -

Situations and circumstance encountered during Operation URGENT FURY (Grenada) made it apparent Pararescuemen were needed to work with Air Force combat control teams.141 The mission need was to care for rescued hostages and wounded warriors.142 This and other mission need causes reoriented the Southeast Asia conflict gained focus on downed fighter pilots back towards the rescue and recovery of isolated personnel. The isolated personnel focus on all who find themselves in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape encompasses the complete range of wartime and peacetime military operations pararescue personnel are trained and equipped to be available to be tasked to accomplish. The reoriented to focus on isolated personnel also prevents mission purpose wandering too far into a peacetime flavor of being nothing but a too expensive medevac service or a public health medical operation running semi-permanent many months’ in place field medical clinics.
Activated at Eglin AFB and deactivated at McClellan AFB the 1730th PRS has an extraordinary history as a line flying unit having no aircraft assigned to it and a concurrent lack of commissioned officers other than its commander and an executive officer assigned to it. Its first commander was Colonel Edward A. Behling, a Biomedical Services Corps (BSC) who had previously served as the Pararescue School Commandant and had completed pararescue training while in this assignment. Colonel Behling was followed by Lieutenant Colonel Mike Haas, a “rated” air force “officer of the line” as commander on 27 July 1989. Lt Col Haas brought with him significant qualifications and experience. He fought in the Republic of South Vietnam as an Army assault helicopter pilot, completing 968 combat flying hours and receiving the Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star, 41 Air Medals, and two Vietnamese Crosses of Gallantry. After separating from the Army, he returned to active duty in the Air Force serving in various special operations and defense intelligence positions. He holds U.S. Army Special Forces and Ranger tabs, U.S. Air Force command pilot and master parachutist wings, Expert Infantry, and Military Free-Fall qualifications, and U.S. Navy open- and closed-circuit Scuba ratings.

The majority of the Air Force’s active duty pararescue personnel were assigned to this “flying” squadron having six detachments and three operating locations dispersed around the world. Other than the 1730th PRS Squadron Commander and the Squadron’s Executive officer position, all other staff and command positions to include Detachment Commander in this squadron normally filled by commissioned officers to include the detachment commander positions were manned by pararescue noncommissioned officers. During the period from 1987 to 1990 that this squadron was active, its members not only participated in numerous humanitarian missions, but also participated in Just Cause (Panama) and other contingencies. The Squadron and its detachments consistently received “satisfactory” to “excellent’ ratings on their Unit Effectiveness Inspections (UEI) and Operational Readiness Inspections (ORI). The 1730th Squadron and each of its detachments and operating locations received the air Force Outstanding Unit award for the period 1 August 1987 to 31 July 1989 (AFOUA GB-030/89).

As each 1730th PRS unit location lacked aircraft integral to the unit, each unit location was attached to flying units having aircraft assigned. However, actual missions and training missions were occasionally flown on available aircraft such as Coast Guard HC-130s and helicopters, Air Force C-130, C-141, and C-5 airlift aircraft and Army, Navy and Marine helicopters.

RSOLL, 1730th PRS and STS are perhaps the greatest forces of operational mission accomplishments to shape views of what pararescue personnel can and do contribute to search and rescue missions and special operations missions.

- SUMMARY -

This history does little more than present a mission-capability utilization pattern to contemplate. The exhibited historical events and activities provide no answers and are not joined to any recommendations for consideration.
The exhibited historical events and activities do reveal availability of an operational capability did result in role and mission cross flow utilization. An operational capability conceived and designed to execute dangerous rescue operations demonstrated interoperability it could enhance the executing and accomplishing of high-risk special operations.

The contribution to both rescue survival and special operations roles and missions also demonstrates the type or warfare being conducted doesn’t create a deceive difference in the level of training and qualifications pararescue personnel must obtain and sustain to have readiness and availability to rescue isolated personnel from within or behind enemy lines. This results in an existence of a versatile team player having the training and qualifications necessary for one role and mission that is the exact similar training and qualifications necessary for another role and mission. The utilization pattern revealed in this history demonstrates this has been an unavoidable reality since 1946.


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98 Zontini, Robert L. E-mail to the author. Sunday, January 20, 2008 12:51:44 AM. Robert Zontini: 1954 enlisted in Air Force, Served as an Independent Duty Medic until becoming a qualified PJ in November 1957. Was a PJ until 1968. This switch was connected to being assigned to the JFK School at Bragg as Intel NCOIC for the HQ. Medically for medical causes as MSGt US Army (SF) August 12th 1972 after 14 months of hospitalization as result of injuries incurred on an operational night jump in S. America.


Leeker, Joe, F., Dr. Air America in Laos II – military aid. © University of Texas at Dallas, 11 August 2008, last updated on 4 March 2013. 4 Online http://www.utdallas.edu/library/specialcollections/hac/cataam/Leeker/history/index.html

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